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ABSTRACT
Data-dependent access patterns of an application to an untrusted storage system are
notorious for leaking sensitive information about the user’s data. Previous research
has shown how an adversary capable of monitoring both read and write requests
issued to the memory can correlate them with the application to learn its sensitive
data. However, information leakage through only the write access patterns is less
obvious and not well studied in the current literature. This work demonstrates an
actual attack on power-side-channel resistant Montgomery’s ladder based modular
exponentiation algorithm commonly used in public key cryptography. The complete
512-bit secret exponent was inferred in∼ 3.5 minutes by virtue of just the write access
patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. In order to learn the victim algorithm’s
write access patterns under realistic settings, this work exploits a compromised DMA
device to take frequent snapshots of the application’s address space, and then run a
simple differential analysis on these snapshots to find the write access sequence. The
attack has been shown on an Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor based system.
Lastly, there are further discussions about a possible attack on McEliece public-key
cryptosystem that also exploits the write-access patterns to learn the secret key.
vii
1 Introduction
Users’ data privacy is becoming a major concern in computation outsourcing in
the current cloud computing world. Numerous secure processor architectures (e.g.,
XOM [1, 2], TPM+TXT [3], Aegis [4], Intel-SGX [5] etc.) have been proposed for
preserving data confidentiality and integrity during a remote secure computation.
The user sends his encrypted data to a secure processor where it is decrypted and
computed upon in a tamper-proof environment, and finally the encrypted results of
the computation are sent back to the user.
While the secure processors provide sufficient levels of security against direct at-
tacks, most of these architectures are still vulnerable to side-channel attacks. For
instance, XOM and Aegis architectures are vulnerable to control flow leakage via ad-
dress bus snooping [6, 7, 8]. Similarly, Intel-SGX, being a strong candidate in secure
architectures, is vulnerable to side-channel attacks via a compromised OS[9].
Zhuang et al. [10] showed that although the data in the main memory of the sys-
tem can be encrypted, the access patterns to the memory could still leak privacy. An
adversary who is able to monitor both read and write accesses made by an application
can relate this pattern to infer secret information of the application. For example,
Islam et al. [11] demonstrated that by observing accesses to an encrypted email repos-
itory, an adversary can infer as much as 80% of the search queries. This, however, is
a very strong adversarial model which, in most cases, requires direct physical access
to the memory address bus. In cloud computing, for example, this requires the cloud
service itself to be untrusted. The challenging requirements posed by the above men-
tioned strong adversarial model leads one to think that applications are vulnerable
to privacy leakage via memory access patterns only if such a strong adversary exists,
1
2i.e., one capable of monitoring both read and write accesses.
In this paper, we counter this notion by demonstrating privacy leakage under
a significantly weaker adversarial model. In particular, we show that an adversary
capable of monitoring only the write access patterns of an application can still learn
a significant amount of its sensitive information. Hence, in the model of computation
outsourcing to a secure processor discussed earlier, even if the cloud service itself is
trusted, a remote adversary is still able to steal private information if the underlying
hardware does not protect against leakage from write access patterns.
We present a real attack on the famous Montgomery’s ladder technique [12] com-
monly used in public key cryptography for modular exponentiation. Exponentia-
tion algorithms, in general, are vulnerable to various timing and power side-channel
attacks [13, 14, 15]. Montgomery’s ladder performs redundant computations as a
countermeasure against power side-channel attacks (e.g., simple power analysis [16]).
However, by monitoring the order of write accesses made by this algorithm, one can
still infer the secret exponent bits.
In our weaker adversarial model, since we cannot directly monitor the memory
address bus, we learn the pattern of write accesses by taking frequent memory snap-
shots. For this purpose, we exploit a compromised Direct Memory Access device
(DMA1) attached to the victim computer system to read the application’s address
space in the system memory [17, 18, 19]. Clearly, any two memory snapshots only
differ in the locations where the data has been modified in the latter snapshot. In
other words, comparing the memory snapshots not only reveals the fact that write
accesses (if any) have been made to the memory, but it also reveals the exact locations
1DMA grants full access of the main memory to certain peripheral buses, e.g. FireWire, Thun-
derbolt etc.
3of the accesses which leads to a precise access pattern of memory writes.
Our experimental setup uses a PCI Express to USB 3.0 adapter attached to the
victim system, alongside an open source application called PCILeech [20], as the com-
promised DMA device. We implement the Montgomery’s ladder for exponentiation
of a 128 byte message with a 64 byte (512 bits) secret exponent [21]. Through our
attack methodology, we are able to infer all 512 secret bits of the exponent in just 3
minutes and 34 seconds on average.
Although our experimental setup utilizes a wired connection to a USB 3.0 port on
the victim system for DMA, Stewin et al. demonstrated that DMA attacks can also
be launched remotely by injecting malware to the dedicated hardware devices, such
as graphic processors and network interface cards, attached to the host platform [22].
Therefore, our attack methodology allows even remote adversaries to exploit the
coarse grained side-channel information obtained by memory snapshots to infer the
secret data. Hence, this effort opens up new research avenues to explore efficient
countermeasures to prevent privacy leakage under remote secure computation.
42 Background
2.1 Exponentiation Algorithms
Exponentiation algorithms have central importance in cryptography, and are con-
sidered to be the back-bone of nearly all the public-key cryptosystems. Although
numerous exponentiation algorithms have been devised, algorithms for constrained
devices are scarcely restricted to the square-and-multiply algorithms. RSA algorithm,
used in e.g. Diffie-Hellman key agreement, is a commonly used exponentiation algo-
rithm which performs computation of the form y = gk mod n, where the attacker’s
goal is to find the secret key k. The commonly used square-and-multiply implementa-
tion of this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. For a given input g and a secret key k,
Algorithm 1 performs multiplication and squaring operations on two local variables
R0 and R1 for each bit of k starting from the most significant bit down to the least
significant bit.
Notice that the conditional statement on line 4 of Algorithm 1 executes based on
the value of secret bit kj. Such conditional branches result in two different power
and timing spectra of the system for kj = 0 and kj = 1, hence leaking the secret key
k over the timing/power side-channels. Similar attacks [21] have leaked 508 out of
512 bits of an RSA key by using branch prediction analysis (BPA). Thus, the attack-
prone nature of RSA algorithm (Algorithm 1) poses a need for an alternate secure
algorithm.
5Algorithm 1 RSA - Left-to-Right Binary Algorithm
Inputs: g, k = (kt−1, · · · , k0)2 Output: y = gk
Start:
1: R0 ← 1; R1 ← g
2: for j = t− 1 downto 0 do
3: R0 ← (R0)2
4: if kj = 1 then R0 ← R0R1 end if
5: end for
return R0
Algorithm 2 Montgomery Power Ladder Algorithm
Inputs: g, k = (kt−1, · · · , k0)2 Output: y = gk
Start:
1: R0 ← 1; R1 ← g
2: for j = t− 1 downto 0 do
3: if kj = 0 then R1 ← R0R1; R0 ← (R0)2
4: else R0 ← R0R1; R1 ← (R1)2
5: end if
6: end for
return R0
2.2 Montgomery’s Power Ladder Algorithm
Montgomery Power Ladder [12] shown in Algorithm 2 performs exponentiation with-
out leaking any information over power side-channel. Regardless of the value of bit
kj, it performs the same number of operations in the same order, hence producing
the same power footprint for kj = 0 and kj = 1. Notice, however, that the specific
order in which R0 and R1 are updated in time depends upon the value of kj. E.g.,
for kj = 0, R1 is written first and then R0 is updated; whereas for kj = 1 the updates
are done in the reverse order. This sequence of write access to R0 and R1 reveals to
the adversary the exact bit values of k. In this paper, we exploit this vulnerability in
a real implementation of Montgomery ladder to learn the secret key k.
63 The Proposed Attack
3.1 Adversarial Model
Consider a computer system that is continuously computing exponentiations of the
form y = gki for the given inputs gi using the same secret exponent k according to
Algorithm 2. We call this system the victim system. All the data stored in the main
memory of this system is encrypted. Let there be a compromised DMA device (e.g.,
a PCI-to-USB adapter) connected to the victim system through which an attacker
system can read the whole main memory of the victim as shown in Figure 3.1. The
attacker system, however, is limited in its ability to successively read the victim’s
memory by the data transfer rate of the underlying DMA interface. The adversary’s
goal is to find the key k by learning the application’s write pattern through frequent
snapshots of the victim system’s memory. The victim system used in our attack
comes with a write-through cache configuration enabled by default. As a result, any
write operations performed by the application are immediately propagated through
the memory hierarchy down to the untrusted DRAM. Furthermore, we assume that
the victim application receives all the inputs gi in a batch and continuously produces
the corresponding cipher texts such that the physical memory region allocated to
the application during successive encryptions remains the same. In other words, the
application is not relocated to a different physical address space by the OS throughout
the attack. Such use cases can be found in the applications that require computing
signatures of large files.
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Figure 3.1: Our adversarial model: The attacker system takes snapshots of the vic-
tim’s DRAM via the PCI adapter to infer the secret key.
3.2 Attack Outline
Given the above mentioned setting, we proceed with our attack methodology as fol-
lows: First, a full scan of the victim’s memory is performed to identify the physical
address space allocated to the victim’s application. Since the adversary requires
victim application’s memory snapshots at a high frequency, it is infeasible for him
to always read the full victim memory because of the data transfer rate being the
frequency limiting factor. Once the address space is identified, the next step is to
identify the two memory regions allocated to each of the local variables R0 and R1 (cf.
Algorithm 2) within the victim application’s address space. This allows any observed
change in either of these two regions to be linked with an update to the variables R0
and R1 respectively. Finally, the updates in R0 and R1 memory regions are observed
via frequent snapshots for a period of one complete encryption, and the order of these
updates is linked back to Algorithm 2 to learn the key k. We explain these steps in
detail in the following subsections.
8Algorithm 3 Victim App’s Address Space Identification
Inputs: M : Set of memory blocks to scan.
Output: S: Set of application’s memory block(s).
Start:
1: S = ∅ . Initially empty set.
2: for m ∈M do . Scan each block.
3: s1 = TakeSnapshot(m)
4: s2 = TakeSnapshot(m)
5: if CompareMatch(s1, s2) then
6: S = S ∪m
7: end if
8: end for
9: return S
3.3 Step 1: Application’s Address Space Identification
Since the application is supposed to be continuously updating its data (e.g., variables
R0, R1), its address space can be identified by finding the memory regions which are
continuously being updated. Algorithm 3 shows this process at an abstract level. The
whole of the victim system’s memory space is divided into M blocks, each of some
reasonable size B (say a few megabytes). Two subsequent snapshots of each block
m ∈ M are compared with each other through CompareMatch procedure. It is a
heuristic based process which searches for a specific pattern of updates between the
two snapshots which potentially represents the application’s footprint. For example, a
sequence of two modified consecutive 64 byte cache lines followed by a few unmodified
cache lines and then further two modified consecutive cache lines would potentially
represent the two 128 byte regions for R0 (first two cache lines) and R1 (last two cache
lines). Finally, a set S of all those memory blocks which show the specific update
sequence searched by CompareMatch is returned. This algorithm is iteratively
repeated until a reasonably small set of memory block(s) (e.g., one 4 kB page) is
9Algorithm 4 Pseudo code for the second phase of attack
Input: S: Application’s memory space. (from Algorithm 3); n: # of
snapshots to cover one full encryption period.
Output: k: Application’s secret key.
Start:
1: V = (s1, · · · , sn) | si = TakeSnapshot(S), 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2: Th = ComputeThreshold(V )
3: W = ∅, k = (0, · · · , 0)
4: V = RemoveUnchangedSnapshots(V )
5: for i = 1 to |V | − 1 do
6: Rxi = Correlate(si, si+1, Th) . xi ∈ {0, 1}
7: W = W ∪Rxi
8: end for
9: i = 1, j = 0
10: for (Rxi , Rxi+1) ∈ W do
11: if Rxi = R0 and Rxi+1 = R1 then kj = 1
12: else if Rxi = R1 and Rxi+1 = R0 then kj = 0
13: end if
14: i = i + 2; j = j + 1
15: end for
return k
identified which is expected to contain the victim application’s address space.
3.4 Step 2: Distinguishing Local Variables R0 and R1
Once the application’s memory space is found, we need to link two distinct regions
within this address space to the variables R0 and R1 in order to determine the key
bits from the order of their updates. For this purpose, a set V of n snapshots of the
application’s space is computed as shown in Algorithm 4. Notice that n is large enough
to cover one full encryption period. The ComputeThreshold procedure computes
a histogram of the updates performed inside the application’s memory over all the
snapshots of set V . Figure 3.2 shows one such histogram for a 4kB page of victim’s
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Figure 3.2: A histogram of # of writes to individual bytes in the victim’s memory
page. A clear distinction is shown between the regions corresponding to variables R0
and R1.
memory. It can be seen that almost all the updates are performed at two distinct
regions spanning over only a few cache lines within the page. These two regions
correspond to the variables R0 and R1 respectively
2. The inactive region between
R0 and R1 represents a threshold which is later used by Correlate procedure to
determine whether a change in two successive memory snapshots corresponds to an
update in R0 or R1 etc.
3.5 Step 3: Inferring the Secret Key
After computing the set of snapshots V and the threshold Th, we enter the final
phase of inferring the secret key (starting from step 4 in Algorithm 4). Up to this
point, the sequence V contains pairs of snapshots that represent changes in R0 and
2We can tell whether R0 or R1 comes first in the memory layout from the declaration order of these
variables in the actual implementation of the exponentiation algorithm (cf. line 1 in Algorithm 2).
11
Memory Snapshot Change in 𝑅0 Change in 𝑅1 No Change
Start of a new 
exponentiation
… … …
Time
𝑘𝑗 = 1
𝑘𝑗 = 0
Ignored
Figure 3.3: Inferring the secret key via observing the sequence of snapshots and the
changes in variables R0 and R1. The pairs of snapshots which do not show any change
are ignored.
R1, and also the pairs which represent no change, as shown in Figure 3.3. The reason
why some pairs do not show any change is because our snapshot frequency is higher
than the rate at which the application updates its data. This allows us to learn the
write access pattern at a fine granularity.
In order to learn the write access pattern, first the pairs of unchanged snapshots
from the sequence V are removed by the procedure RemoveUnchangedSnap-
shots(V ). The resulting sequence V only contains pairs which always represent
a change, either in R0 or R1. Now, each pair of two successive snapshots is corre-
lated to an update in either R0 or R1 by Correlate procedure using the threshold
computed earlier.
As mentioned earlier, Montgomery ladder algorithm performs computations upon
local variables, where the order of variable updates is based on the secret exponent
bits (cf. Algorithm 2). Therefore, judging from the order of updates made in R0 and
R1, each pair of updates (Rxi , Rxi+1) ∈ W is linked back to the corresponding value
of the secret key bit kj as shown in figure 3.3. As the set W contains the history of
all the updates to R0 and R1 for a complete encryption, therefore all the key bits can
be inferred through the above mentioned process.
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4 Attack Demonstration
4.1 Experimental Setup
Our experiment setup uses two computer systems, one being the attacker and the
other being the victim. In our experiments, the victim system is DELL XPS 8700,
comprising of Intel Core(TM) i7-4790 3.60GHz processor that uses Ubuntu 14.04.3
LTS operating system with a Linux kernel 3.19.0-43-generic, and has 16GB of main
memory. The attacker machine is a 64-bit Windows 10 based system having 8GB of
main memory. A PCI adapter module, called USB Evaluation Board [23], is connected
to the victim via the PCI-Express slot and acts as a compromised DMA device (cf.
Figure 3.1). This DMA device, together with PCILeech software [20], allows the
attacker to monitor victim’s memory and/or take its snapshots. To implement our
attack, the PCILeech software has been extended to first find the application’s address
space in the victim’s memory (cf. Algorithm 3), and then attack the identified address
space to infer the secret key (cf. Algorithm 4)). The above mentioned attacking
algorithms run while the victim application is executing.
We have written our own C++ implementation of the Montgomery ladder based
exponentiation algorithm3 for large input sizes (128 Bytes or more) that runs on the
victim system. The victim system has a BIOS version A11 which supports write-
through enabled L1 and L2 caches while disabling the L3 cache by default. Besides
caches, any data modifications in the register file should also be propagated to the
DRAM. The register file (usually of size 64-128 Bytes) is used by the processor to
temporarily hold the operands and results during computations. Since our imple-
3Available at : https://github.com/meriniamjo/RSA-Montgomery-Ladder-Implementation
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mentation uses multiple temporary variables and function calls for proper execution
of the algorithm, the large “active” working set of the application cannot fit into the
register file and results in register spills. Hence, any updates made by the application
are immediately propagated – through register file and caches – down to the main
memory as each multiplication/squaring write operation in performed. Section 4.2
explains the step by step details about how the attack is launched.
4.2 Experimental Results
In order to take memory snapshots via PCI module and the PCILeech software, the
attacker first needs to load a kernel module into the victim system via the PCI module
itself. Notice that the attacker does not require any extra privileges to do so. We
use the following command via PCILeech software to load the kernel into victim’s
DRAM. When the kernel is loaded, an address is spitted out by the software, which
shows where the module resides in the victim’s memory. Loading the kernel into
memory is a rapid process and takes only a few milliseconds to complete the process.
D:\>pcileech kmdload −kmd LINUX X64
KMD: Code inserted into the kernel
KMD: Execution received - continuing ...
KMD: Successfully loaded at 0x1b54a000
D:\>_
In the meantime, the Montgomery’s ladder exponentiation algorithm is run on
the victim machine using a 128 byte (1024 bits) message along with a secret key of
64 bytes (512 bits).
14
[user@victim]$ ./montgomery exponentiation
With the application running and the kernel module loaded into victim’s memory,
we proceed to find the potential regions in the DRAM which are being accessed
frequently by taking multiple snapshots. To retrieve these snapshots, we issue the
pagefind command shown below which uses the loaded kernel module’s address to
access the victim’s full memory.
We integrated the pagefind command into the PCILeech software to iteratively
find regions getting modified persistently. pagefind narrows down the selected regions
to a single page by constantly monitoring and comparing the changes being made,
and returns the address of the page where application’s array data structures are
defined. This step corresponds to Application’s Address Space Identification phase
of the attack (cf. Algorithm 3) and is the most time consuming phase. To read the
whole memory, comparing their respective snapshots and narrowing down to a single
page of 4KB from 16GB search space takes ∼3 minutes and 30 seconds.
D:\>pcileech pagefind −kmd 0x1b542000
Matching Pattern ...
Page Finding: Successful.
Total Time = 210199 Milliseconds
Victim Page Address : 0xd271c000
D:\>_
As shown above, from the first phase we retrieve the address of the page where
application’s data structures are stored. Proceeding towards our second and third
step namely Distinguishing Local Variables and Inferring the Secret Key (cf. Section
3.4, 3.5), we use another integrated command pageattack. It first takes a predefined
15
number of snapshots of the application page provided by the first step, and distin-
guishes the message (R1) and algorithm result (R0) from the rest of the stale data,
residing on the memory page. It then uses the order of changes in R0 and R1 to infer
the secret key.
D:\>pcileech pageattack −min 0xd271c000
Attack Successful.
Total Time = 3596 Milliseconds
Inferred Key is:
1a 4b 28 41 e6 27 d4 7d
72 c3 40 79 be 1f 6c 35
ca 3b 58 b1 96 17 04 ed
22 b3 70 e9 6e 0f 9c a5
7a 2b 88 21 46 07 34 5d
d2 a3 a0 59 1e ff cc 15
2a 1b b8 91 f6 f7 64 cd
82 93 d0 c9 ce ef fc 85
D:\>_
This final step takes ∼3.6 seconds to complete and returns the complete 512 bit
secret key learned from only the write access patterns. Combing the times associated
with all the attack phases, the total attack time comes out to be ∼3 minutes, 34
seconds.
16
5 Leakage under Caching Effects
In view of our proposed attack on Montgomery ladder based exponentiation algo-
rithm, the updates to the application data should always be available in the DRAM
of the victim system before an attacker issues a memory snapshot request. This is
only possible if the victim system has write-through enabled cache hierarchy or the
caches are disabled altogether. Whereas, on the other hand, modern processors typ-
ically consist of large on-chip write-back caches where the updates to application’s
data are only be visible in DRAM once the data is evicted from the last level cache
(LLC). Thus in the attack proposed in Section 3, the caching effects are not catered
for, which introduce ‘noise’ to the precise write-access sequence inferred earlier, hence
making the attacker’s job difficult. A possible workaround to deal with such caching
effects is to collect several ‘noisy’ sequences of memory snapshots and then run corre-
lation analysis on them to learn the precise write-access pattern. Furthermore, if the
adversary is also a user of the same computer system, it can flush the system caches
frequently to reduce the noise in write-access sequence even further.
Another (more efficient) attack scenario under write-back caches would be when
the application has a strided memory access pattern that causes contention over the
cache sets, and hence forces its own data to be evicted to make room for the new
data in the cache. In the following subsection, we discuss how such a strided memory
access pattern can lead to evictions to the DRAM which could potentially leak private
information.
17
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Figure 5.1: A strided memory access pattern with a stride of 4.
5.1 Memory Striding and Cache Set Contention
A strided memory access pattern is the one where each request to the memory is for
the same number of bytes, and the access pointer is incremented by the same amount
between each request. An array accessed with a stride of exactly the same size as the
size of each of its elements results in accessing contiguous locations in the memory.
Such access patterns are said to have a stride value of 1. Figure 5.1 shows a non-unit
striding access pattern in which the elements 0, 4, 8, 12, · · · of an array A are accessed.
This access pattern has a stride value of 4.
Consider a simple system which has a 2-way set-associative write-back cache with
a total capacity of 8 cache lines, as shown in Figure 5.2. The strided access pattern
from Figure 5.1 accesses every 4ith element of the array A, where i = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
Assuming that each element of A is of size equal to the cache line size, for a simple
modulus based cache hash function, the elements A[0], A[4], A[8], · · · are mapped to
18
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Figure 5.2: A 2-way set-associative cache with contention on a single set.
the same set causing contention over set 0. Since the cache associativity is only 2,
this access sequence causes evictions from the cache when both ways of set 0 contain
valid cache lines. Similarly, elements A[1], A[5], A[9], · · · map to set 1, and this access
sequence will cause evictions from set 1, and so on. In other words, such write-access
sequences are still propagated almost immediately to the next level in the memory
hierarchy (e.g., DRAM) even under write-back caches, which could potentially leak
information. This is an artifact of the cache implementation combined with the
striding access pattern of the application.
It must be noted that, not all evictions result in updates to the main memory.
Typically, only dirty cache lines, caused by data writes, evicted from the cache are
propagated to the main memory. Clean evictions from the cache are simply discarded
resulting in no change in the main memory since it already contains a clean copy of
the data.
Assume that an application generates two distinguishable striding write-access
patterns that result in contention at two different cache sets, leading to evictions
from the cache. Consequently, the resulting write-access access sequence will be
revealed to an adversary who is capable of monitoring changes in the main memory,
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potentially resulting in privacy leakage.
5.2 Striding Application: Gaussian Elimination
In Section 5.1 we discussed, using a toy example, how a strided access pattern can lead
to information leakage. Now we present a realistic example which has such a striding
access pattern, and later in Section 5.3 we show how such a pattern can be exploited
to learn private information. We consider the application of Gaussian Elimination
of large binary matrices carrying substantial amount of information. Clearly, these
large matrices cannot fit into the caches, therefore there will be cache evictions as a
result of Gaussian elimination operations.
Gaussian elimination a.k.a. row reduction is a method for solving system of linear
equations by the use of matrices in the form Ax = B. Row reduction is done by
doing a series of elementary row operations which modify the matrix until it forms
an upper triangular matrix, i.e., elements underneath the main diagonal are zeros.
Different types of elementary row operations include swapping two rows, multiplying
a row by a non-zero number and adding a multiple of one row to another. The
upper triangular matrix formed out of these operations will be in row echelon form.
When the leading coefficient (pivot) in each row is 1, and every column containing
the leading coefficient has zeros elsewhere, the matrix is said to be in reduced row
echelon form. The Gaussian elimination algorithm consists of two processes, one being
forward elimination that converts the matrix to row echelon form and the other is
backward substitution that calculates values of the unknowns. These processes result
in solving the linear equation.
Gauss-Jordan elimination uses a similar approach for finding the inverse of a
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matrix. For a n × n square matrix S, elementary row operations can be applied to
reduce the matrix into reduced echelon form, and furthermore, for computing the
matrix inverse if it exits. Initially, the n × n identity matrix I is augmented to
the right of S, forming a n × 2n block matrix [S|I]. Now, upon applying the row
operations, the left block can be reduced to the identity matrix I if S is invertible.
This gives S−1 which is the right block of the final matrix. In a nutshell, we continue
performing row operations until [S|I] becomes [I|S−1].
Consider that the matrix under elimination is stored in a column-contiguous man-
ner in the computer system’s main memory. In other words, each column occupies a
contiguous chunk of memory equal to the column size, after which the next column
resides, and so on. When consecutive elements of a row of this matrix are accessed
during a row operation, the corresponding memory access pattern results in a striding
sequence, where the stride length is equal to the column size. If the stride length is
such that it creates contention on particular cache sets corresponding to particular
rows, this would reveal the modified row, which in turn could potentially leak the
binary matrix itself (cf. Section 5.3).
5.3 Attacking McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem
McEliece public key cryptosystem [24], an asymmetric encryption algorithm, uses an
error correcting code for a description of the private key. This encryption uses a fast
and efficient decoding algorithm, namely a Goppa code and hides the structure of the
code by transformation of the generator matrix. This transformation yields the public
key and the structure of the Goppa code together with the transformation parameters,
which further provides the trapdoor information. For a linear code C, generator
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
1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
 ←−+
←−−−+
[Step 1]
→

1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
 ←−+
[Step 2]
→

1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
 ←−+
←−−−+
[Step 3]
→

1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1
 ←−+
←−−−+
[Step 4]
Figure 5.3: The Gaussian Elimination process on a 4× 4 binary matrix.
matrix G, random invertible matrix S and random permutation matrix P , the matrix
G∗ = SGP is made public while P , G, and S form the private key. A message m
is encrypted along with a random error vector using the equation c = mG∗ + e,
where c refers to the ciphertext. In the decryption process, we compute c∗ = cP−1,
decode c∗ to m∗ by the decoding algorithm, and lastly compute m = m∗S−1. Notice,
that S is a private binary matrix whose inverse is used to recover the message m.
Any system carrying out this encryption/decryption process could either store the
matrix inverse (for better performance) or calculate the inverse during the run time.
However, the latter could lead to the leakage of the binary matrix via write-access
patterns during the inverse computation. In this section we will demonstrate how
performing Gauss-Jordan elimination [25] on the binary secret matrix S could lead
to its complete exposure as a consequence of cache striding and cache set contention
as shown in section 5.1.
For the ease of demonstration we consider a 4 × 4 binary matrix. The elements
stored in the main memory are column contiguous. We assume that each element
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of the matrix is cache line aligned for performance reasons. In other words, each
element is stored in a unique cache line in order to avoid false sharing within a cache
line. Considering a system with a 2-way 4-set associative cache, each row of the
matrix is mapped to one cache set due to the cache structure (cf. Figure 5.2). The
elimination process to obtain the inverse of the binary matrix S4×4 is shown step by
step in Figure 5.3. After these row operations, we obtain an identity matrix I4×4.
In each of the above 4 steps, the corresponding pivot row is added to another row
or rows. For example, in Step [1] row 1 is added to row 2 and row 4. Similarly,
row 2 is added to row 3 in Step [2]. As a row operation is performed, the elements
of the target row are modified and result in cache line evictions, since accessing
a whole row causes contention over the corresponding set it is mapped to, and a
cache set can only store 2 elements of a row at a time. For instance, in Step [1],
row 2 and row 4 are modified causing contention and evictions from set 1 and 3
respectively. Consequently, an adversary can learn the identifier of the row being
updated during each row operation by monitoring the address space in which any
updates take place, and then linking it back to the row number. Now, by definition
of the elimination algorithm, all column elements corresponding to rows that undergo
addition operations can be inferred as 1s, and the remaining ones as 0s. Hence, in
each of Step [1], Step [2], Step [3] and Step [4], we infer the corresponding pivot
column to be C1 = {1, 1, 0, 1}, C2 = {0, 1, 1, 0}, C3 = {1, 1, 1, 0} and C4 = {1, 0, 1, 1}
respectively.
Notice that C2, C3, and C4 obtained in the above steps show the respective in-
termediate forms of the corresponding columns of S during the elimination process.
These values, however, can be used to recover the original column values of matrix
S through back substitution process, as shown in Figure 5.4. In this process, each
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C2 =

0
1
1
0
 ←−+
←−−−+
→

0
1
1
0
 = S2
C3 =

1
1
1
0
 ←−+

1
1
0
0
 ←−+
←−−−+
→

1
0
0
1
 = S3
C4 =

1
0
1
1
←−+
←−−−+ 
0
1
1
1
←−+

0
1
0
1
←−+
←−−−+
→

0
1
0
1
= S4
Figure 5.4: Back Substitution process to recover secret binary matrix S.
column Ci undergoes the row operations performed (and inferred) in each of the steps
Step [i-1],Step [i-2], · · · ,Step [1], precisely in this order. For example, C2 under-
goes addition of row 1 to rows 2 and 4, while C3 performs addition of row 2 to row
3 along with the addition of row 1 to rows 2 and 4. Upon completion of the back
substitution process, the complete secret matrix S is recovered by the adversary.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Potential Threats in Database Applications
Database applications are ubiquitously being used to facilitate simultaneous updates
and queries from multiple users. Such databases and cloud servers could store high
volumes of data regarding an organization’s operations. Examples include databases
that record contact and credit information etc. about employees in an organization.
In such databases, the key or the record locater of a piece of information, for instance,
can be the social security number of the employee. Leaking the SSN of an employee
from above mentioned databases can be detrimental [26]. In the following, we discuss
how write-access patterns could potentially leak private information stored in two
commonly used data structures.
Linked List
Linked list data structure is a collection of a group of data elements, called nodes,
which together represent a sequence. Consider the users’ encrypted private informa-
tion stored in a singly linked list based on the increasing order of their social security
numbers (SSN). The linked list is stored in the victim system’s disk. The adversary’s
goal is to collect as many valid SSNs (which represent identities of real humans) from
this linked list as possible.
Assume that two attackers are working in tandem and both of them are users of
the linked list database mentioned above. Since for each search/update operation, the
linked list is traversed started from the first node up to the node being searched/up-
dated, all these nodes will be loaded from the disk into the DRAM in the specific
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ascending order. Meanwhile, since the adversaries can monitor the DRAM snapshots
throughout this process, they learn the exact order of each node in the linked list.
Now, the adversaries can insert/update their own information in the database while
monitoring the resulting memory write pattern. This allows them to link their own
SSNs to two particular nodes in the linked list, separated by potentially a small num-
ber of other nodes. Crucially, this gives the adversaries a potentially small range
of valid SSNs bounded by the two adversarial SSNs. Next time, whenever a user’s
information is updated which results in modifying a node between two adversarial
nodes, the adversaries can brute force the small range of SSNs to find the valid SSN
of the particular user.
Binary Search Tree (BST)
Binary search tree (BST) data structure stores data in memory while allowing fast
lookup, addition and removal of the stored data. To perform a lookup/update oper-
ation, BST looks for a key by traversing the tree from root to leaf while choosing left
or right child at each level based on the key to be searched.
Consider a similar scenario as in Section 6.1 where the data is stored in a BST
instead, and assume that the attackers know the initial layout of the BST in the
victim system’s memory. Since traversing the tree involves only read accesses, this
won’t leak any information in our model. However, in case of write accesses (inserting
or updating a node), the position where the node is inserted or updated will be
leaked. Following a similar strategy as Section 6.1, the adversary can deduce a range
of SSNs by inserting his own nodes in the BST. A larger group of individuals acting
as adversary can deduce further smaller ranges of SSNs resulting in easier attack.
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Notice that during this type of attack, the subtree corresponding to the range of
SSNs found by the adversary should not be evicted from DRAM. If, for some reason,
the pages corresponding to the vulnerable subtree are swapped out to disk by the OS,
the layout of the subtree in the DRAM could be different once it is loaded in DRAM
next time. In this case, the adversary will need to relearn the BST layout in DRAM
by monitoring several updates over a long period of time.
6.2 Future Work: Countermeasures for Our Attack
One approach to prevent privacy leakage via write-access pattern leveraging DMA
based attacks, as demonstrated in this paper, could be to block certain DMA ac-
cesses through modifications in the DRAM controller. However, this approach poses
complexity in terms of how to determine which accesses to allow and which ones to
block. Furthermore, it requires this ‘extended’ DRAM controller to be included in
the trusted computing base (TCB) of the system which is undesirable.
Another strong candidate is Oblivious RAM which is a well known technique to
prevent privacy leakage via memory access patterns. Although, current so called fully
functional ORAMs, which obfuscate both read and write patterns, offer a possible
countermeasure (at a cost of performance penalty) against the attack we demon-
strated. However, the extra protection (read pattern obfuscation) offered by these
approaches is an overkill for current attack scenario and incurs redundant performance
penalties.
A better alternative could be a write-only ORAM [27, 28, 29] which only ob-
fuscates write-access patterns and not the reads. This technique offers far better
performance than a fully functional ORAM under such weaker adversarial models.
27
It has been shown that write-only ORAM has an optimal asymptotic communica-
tion overhead of O(1) as compared to the fully functional ORAM schemes, which are
asymptotically Ω(log n) [27].
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7 Conclusion
Privacy leakage via purely write-access patterns is less obvious and not extensively
studied in the current literature. We demonstrate a real attack on Montgomery’s
ladder based modular exponentiation algorithm and infer the secret exponent by just
learning the write access patterns of the algorithm to the main memory. We adapt
the traditional DMA based exploits to learn the application’s write access pattern
in a reasonable time. Our attack takes just 3 minutes and 34 seconds to learn 512
secret bits from a typical Linux based victim system. A possible attack on McEliece
public-key cryptosystem has also been presented. We discuss some possible coun-
termeasures to prevent such attacks. Further research towards developing efficient
countermeasures is left as future work.
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